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Chapter 5
Conflict Transformation, Cultural
Innovation, and Loyalist Identity in
Northern Ireland
Lee A. Smithey
Walking through the streets of loyalist1 working-class East Belfast or the
Shankill Road, one encounters political and cultural expressions rang-
ing from hastily daubed slogans and acronyms of paramilitary organiza-
tions to flags, banners, and elaborate wall murals. The murals celebrate
historic victories and crises in loyalist mythology, commemorate fallen
comrades and neighbors, and valorize paramilitary organizations and
local bands. They have become hallmarks of Northern Ireland’s Trou-
bles, and in recent years have become the subject of a growing tourism
industry. Scholars have noted the functions murals serve in expressing
communal identity and ideology, marking territory, and delivering state-
ments beyond the locale in which the murals reside (Jarman 2005; Rols-
ton 1991). I will focus on the role murals and other cultural expressions
play in expressing and shaping communal identity and communicating
beyond the community, and I argue that they constitute mediums
through which communities and their leaders can experiment with a
community’s symbolic landscape and shift the focus of their collective
identity from defensiveness and exclusivity to one that is more inclusive
and empowering.
Walking through East Belfast, one now comes across murals featuring
local historical and cultural topics such as the building of the passenger
liner Titanic and C. S. Lewis’s The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe. The
redesign of paramilitary murals and modification of other traditional
forms of cultural expression reflect shifts in historical perspective, offer
alternative cultural expressions and a means of pursuing collective griev-
ances, and generally shift the tone of loyalism, even if only relative to
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86 Lee A. Smithey
the traditional ubiquity of martial themes that have reinforced siege
mentalities and alienated Catholic nationalist communities.2 Murals and
other forms of publicly expressing loyalist identity provide windows onto
a critical process in conflict transformation: changing perceptions of the
conflict and softening out-group boundaries by redefining collective
identities in ways that are empowering and yet less polarizing.
This essay is part of a larger research project examining a growing
shift among loyalists as they attempt to enhance their political cachet by
modifying public expressions of collective identity, such as parades and
bonfires that have traditionally been seen by Northern Ireland’s Catho-
lics and many outsiders as intimidating and triumphalist. Collective
action and collective identity are mutually recursive, and a change in
one signals or requires a change in the other. To the extent that loyalists
begin to publicly emphasize features of their identity, often through cul-
tural expressions and enactments, that are not defensive or retributive
expressions toward Catholic nationalists and republicans, they signal a
new orientation across the political and sectarian divide. While they aim
to maintain in-group solidarity and ontological security through these
practices, they also lower the salience of sectarian and ethnopolitical
boundaries that have helped fuel conflict in Ireland.
Local community leaders and activists play an important role in exper-
imenting with the boundaries of communal identities, using their own
intimate and internalized sense of their communities to carefully cho-
reograph innovative public expressions of loyalism. This process contri-
butes to conflict transformation in Northern Ireland as loyalists attempt
to empower themselves, diminish the intensity of their siege mentality,
and orient themselves in a more cooperative way to new political and
economic circumstances in the region. Here, I present a model for grass-
roots conflict transformation, emphasize the importance of identity in
ethnopolitical conflict in Northern Ireland, and detail the role murals
play as a medium for the expression of and innovation in loyalist collec-
tive identity. I use as an illustration the ability of local leaders to maintain
and yet reorient loyalist worldviews and narratives in ways that could
improve the environment for community relations work and continued
political progress toward a shared democratic future.
Ethnopolitical Identity and Conflict
Polarized ethnic identities have become a widely recognized factor
exacerbating allegedly intractable conflicts as groups develop contradic-
tory, negative, and mutually reinforcing out-group stereotypes. In
extreme conflict situations, groups can become so polarized that the
conflict itself constitutes a fundamental element in groups’ inverse iden-
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Conflict Transformation and Loyalist Identity 87
tities. Adversaries’ identities can become defined in such a way that they
are mutually exclusive of one another, indivisible, and nonnegotiable.
They become inseparable from conflict that tends to be seen in zero-
sum terms reflecting exclusive definitions of ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them.’’ Using
this calculus, any gain by one side amounts to an unacceptable loss by
the other side, and to each group, it seems as if their very existence is
under threat. Such groups respond defensively, and further modify their
own worldviews to distinguish their opponents in even more stark terms
(Brewer and Higgins 1998; Coy and Woehrle 2000; Kriesberg, Northrup,
and Thorson 1989; Northrup 1997; Tajfel 1981; Waddell and Cairns
1986). Such conflicts are often called ‘‘intractable’’ because the vicious
cycle involving identity and retributive collective action becomes almost
seamless. As Northrup (1992) points out, a cultural ‘‘collusion’’ can
develop between adversaries in ethnic conflict. When groups define
themselves and each other in terms of the conflict, they collude in per-
petuating the psychological bases for destructive conflict. Giving up the
conflict is akin to giving up an important part of their own identity.
Identity plays such a crucial role in these conflicts because shared
schema for perceiving the world around them direct ethnic groups to
interpret their actions and those of their opponents in ways that protect
in-group ontological security. Ross (2001) calls these schema ‘‘psycho-
cultural interpretations’’ or ‘‘the shared, deeply rooted worldviews that
help groups make sense of daily life and provide psychologically mean-
ingful accounts of a group’s relationship with other groups, their actions
and motives’’ (159). We refer to worldviews that become widely shared
as ‘‘collective identities’’ that are constructed and reconstructed from
origin myths, historical narratives, commentary on contemporary states
of affairs, and teleological visions (especially when religion serves as a
resource for identity construction) (Brewer and Higgins 1998; Higgins
and Brewer 2002).
Polarized communal identities are constructed and reconstructed on
a daily basis over long periods of time, sometimes spectacularly (through
intimidation and direct attacks), symbolically (public rituals, flags, and
emblems), and sometimes in quite mundane ways (what newspaper one
buys, where one shops, or where one attends school). Each becomes
invested with emotional value, and one of the greatest challenges in
addressing intractable conflict in divided societies lies in slowing and
reversing a vicious and yet often subtle cycle of out-group prejudice,
dehumanization, coercion, and fear. To the extent that opponents in a
conflict situation ignore, condone, or openly advocate intimidation or
violence, they will heighten out-group boundaries and cast responsibility
for violence on one another. Intergroup boundaries can become so
rigid and others vilified and dehumanized to such an extent that group
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88 Lee A. Smithey
members become more likely to sanction and employ the use of lethal
force, fueling a cycle of fear, retribution, and division.
In intractable conflicts, according to social identity theorists, natural
tendencies to create in-group/out-group distinctions become height-
ened as each group feels under threat and rallies around increasingly
defensive collective identities seeking to maintain ontological security.
However, the process is not aberrant; the construction of in-group and
out-group identities is part and parcel of social life. Cognitive psycholo-
gists, through social identity theory, assert that all people have a limited
capacity for processing stimuli from the world around them. They sim-
plify the world though social schemata, stereotypes, or ideologies, thus
meeting a need for ontological coherence and maintaining a positive
sense of self-worth, self-efficacy, and self-authenticity. The combination
of these drives produces solidarity and in-group cohesion, while strongly
differentiating one’s own group from out-groups facilitates the process
(Cairns 1994; Gecas 2000; Melucci 1995; Tajfel 1982).
In societies that have become deeply divided and in which groups
have come to fear one another, the options of leaving one’s own group
are limited, either because the social solidarity costs are so high or there
simply are not other groups readily available to which one can switch.
As Cairns (1994) has put it, ‘‘What I hope Social Identity Theory will do
is influence people to see the conflict as a form of behavior which is
determined by essentially normal psychological processes, but normal
psychological processes which are operating in exceptional circum-
stances’’ (14). Those circumstances include a long history of colonial-
ism, resistance, discrimination, open conflict, and in many cases poverty.
Political struggles of this sort that involve core group identities (con-
sider Israel and Palestine, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia) have
proven particularly contentious and susceptible to intractability (Kries-
berg 1998b; Northrup 1989).
In Northern Ireland, a range of political, religious, and ethnic tradi-
tions tend to align broadly into Protestant unionist/loyalist and Catholic
nationalist/republican blocs that maintain incompatible views on the
history and sovereignty of six of the nine counties of Ulster that make
up Northern Ireland. Religious sectarianism, language, music, and com-
munal values, to name a few, are employed to distinguish one commu-
nity from another or signal out-group differences, either through public
display, such as ritual, or in discourse and narrative within and between
groups.
Over centuries of conflict in Ireland and over the course of the ‘‘Trou-
bles,’’ from approximately 1968 to 1998, Northern Ireland has become
a deeply divided society in which Protestants and Catholics have been
pushed and pulled into segregated public spheres. British colonialism,
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Conflict Transformation and Loyalist Identity 89
Protestant unionist rule through the middle of the twentieth century,
paramilitary intimidation, and radical political movements have each
contributed to the trend. Protestants and Catholics motivated by fear,
anger, habit, and tradition have routinely segregated themselves in edu-
cation, housing, sports, and arts, to name a few domains. While a great
deal of attention is paid to the working-class communities in which para-
militarism and the state’s counterterrorism efforts have been focused,
ethnopolitical division is subtly perpetuated or allowed to continue
throughout society (Liechty and Clegg 2001).
Conflict Transformation
Conflict in Northern Ireland has taken remarkable turns toward peace
in recent years. Tentative and secretive back-channel contacts and nego-
tiations in the early 1990s led to the 1994 ceasefires, followed by difficult
negotiations that produced the Belfast Agreement (often called the
Good Friday Agreement) and powersharing governance in the form of
the Northern Ireland Assembly. The assembly collapsed in the wake of
an espionage scandal in 2002 but was restored in the spring of 2007,
again after much political turmoil and negotiation, under the leader-
ship of erstwhile adversaries Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness of the
Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin, respectively. Throughout the
political peace process, careful negotiations, impression management,
risk-taking, and artful diplomacy on the part of politicians and influen-
tial leaders in civil society have made an imperfect but viable plan for
democratic politics possible.
A comprehensive attempt to make sustainable politics work in North-
ern Ireland will have to consider the immense influence of polarized
ethnic identities. Political peace processes are essential to the transfor-
mation of ethnopolitical conflict into constructive politics, but they are
inevitably tied to grassroots community relations. Over time, as conflicts
become inseparable from the cultures and identities of the communities
in which they are waged, political negotiations become increasingly dif-
ficult. Political leaders’ abilities to make compromises and embrace new
initiatives are enabled and limited by their support bases and the extent
to which their respective communities have become alienated from one
another and feel that their traditions and identity are under threat. If
agreed structural arrangements that facilitate political cooperation
allow the cultural and psychological underpinnings of division to persist,
they bring the sustainability of peace into question. Rev. Gary Mason of
the East Belfast Mission, who has undertaken a great deal of community
development work in the area characterized the challenge: ‘‘I think my
worry always about this peace process is if you do end up building a
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90 Lee A. Smithey
benign apartheid, there’s nothing to say that in ten or fifteen years the
thing cannot begin all over again, but you know there are big questions.
How do you heal memories? How do you get people to engage genu-
inely? There are lots of models out there. But what is genuine engage-
ment? What does that mean? And, how do you stop people when the
doors are closed, the curtains are closed, telling stories, passing pain,
hatred, and sectarianism down to another generation?’’3 The persis-
tence of mutually polarized social worlds and identities remains an
important concern with which practitioners and scholars continue to
wrestle as peace processes are largely dependent on changes in grass-
roots identities and aspirations that have often been forged and hard-
ened over decades of violent conflict.
A great deal of effort has been directed at undermining prejudice and
stereotyping, especially among youth in Northern Ireland, in attempts
to ‘‘transform’’ conflict. Conflict transformation involves both a shift
away from coercive means of conducting conflict to persuasion or
reward and subjective redefinitions of out-groups (Kriesberg 1998a).4
Unlike conflict resolution initiatives, which tend to focus more narrowly
on encouraging adversaries’ representatives to negotiate over discrete
aspirations and grievances, often with the assistance of a third-party neu-
tral mediator, conflict transformation efforts recognize the importance
of building and improving relationships at multiple levels, from grassroots
to the ‘‘highest’’ levels of politics. A conflict is in a state of transforma-
tion when fundamentally polarized in-group and out-group perceptions
have begun to change, albeit slowly and incrementally, and when each
side’s narratives and the society’s symbolic landscape become less polari-
zing (Ross 2007). These shifts can be understood as both indicators of
social structural and political change and as prerequisites for future
change. Emotions, identities, ideologies, prejudices, and the rituals and
expressions that express and sustain them in both Protestant and Catho-
lic communities must begin to accommodate one another such that an
increasing level of trust can be established that enables conflict resolu-
tion work to establish an infrastructure of nonviolent politics and coop-
eration in civil society (Lederach 1997). Ethnopolitical identities in this
model are sturdy to be sure, but they are also malleable, opening possi-
bilities for the mitigation of deeply polarized collective identities.
Transformation Within Communities and Traditions
Cultivating pliable collective identities remains a central challenge for
peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. I argue here that much of the criti-
cal work of developing less polarized collective identities takes place
within even the most traumatized communities, and I offer examples
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Conflict Transformation and Loyalist Identity 91
from loyalist neighborhoods in Northern Ireland where mural redesign
projects and other innovations in traditional cultural expressions may
contribute to reshaping contours of loyalist identity. In urban communi-
ties, where the violence of the Troubles has been concentrated, orga-
nized violence and cultural expressions exert an influence within
communities and foster stark out-group divisions, often between Protes-
tant and Catholic neighborhoods that adjoin one another. This chapter
focuses primarily on loyalist East Belfast, but I hasten to reemphasize
that while contention between urban loyalist and republican areas can
be particularly severe, sectarian and political division in Northern Ire-
land is perpetuated across the region in rural and middle-class commu-
nities, often through the daily structuration of parallel Protestant and
Catholic lifeworlds.5
A great deal of time, effort, and resources have been expended in
Northern Ireland over the past twenty-five years in important program-
matic attempts to improve community relations (Bloomfield 1997; Fitz-
duff 2002). Some refer disparagingly to the ‘‘community relations
industry’’ of professional researchers, trainers, administrators, and
youth and community workers who have worked to bridge the sectarian
gap, most often among youth. Mediation programs, cross-community
clubs, art initiatives, international travel programs, and sports tourna-
ments, to name a few, have aimed to diminish alienation and fear gener-
ated by three decades and more of ethnopolitical conflict. Research by
Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfeld (2002b) shows that peace and conflict reso-
lution organizations (PCROs) in Northern Ireland have made signifi-
cant, if sometimes subtle, contributions that can prove difficult to
quantify (Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfeld 2002a; Schubotz and Robinson
2006). Still, the challenge of overcoming the polarization of Protestant
and Catholic communities remains, as evidenced by high levels of resi-
dential segregation and the continued prominence of ethnopolitical
identities (Poole and Doherty 1996; Shuttleworth and Lloyd 2006).
Much of the community relations work carried out by PCROs has
been based on contact theory which holds that bringing groups (usually
youth) who are alienated from one another into contact can help break
down stereotypes and prejudices, opening the way for dialogue and
mutual understanding. Research has focused on determining the most
conducive circumstances in which contact produces the desired results
(Amir 1969; Cairns 1994; Connolly 2000; Hewstone and Brown 1986;
Pettigrew 1998). During the 1990s, however, many community relations
practitioners found that bringing Protestant and Catholic groups
together for brief periods of time was less effective than they had hoped,
especially if each group lacked a critical level of self-awareness regarding
their own identity, history, and fears. Thus, ‘‘single-identity’’ work, as it
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92 Lee A. Smithey
has been called, became prominent among practitioners (Church, Vis-
ser, and Johnson 2004; Hughes 2003). The work is premised on the idea
that groups of people who are not confident in their own identity are
more likely to feel anxiety in their encounters with members of other
communities, to respond aggressively, and are less likely to overcome
stereotypes and broaden their identification outside of their traditional
community (Niens, Cairns, and Hewstone 2003).
I propose we can take the single-identity lesson further by seeking to
identify and better understand attempts developed within communities
to define, critique, and modify their own senses of identity. According
to Schubotz and Robinson’s (2006) analysis of the 2005 ‘‘Young Life and
Times Survey’’ in Northern Ireland, 45 percent of respondents identi-
fied their family as the most important influence on their views about
the other religious community. Nineteen percent identified friends as
most influential, predictably suggesting that out-group attitudes are sus-
tained within communities. Contact theory research finds that projects
designed and executed with the initiative or approval of local commu-
nity leaders allow greater freedom for participants to experiment with
new orientations toward out-groups (Amir 1969; Pettigrew 1998). When
local community leaders and authority figures undertake to alter or
selectively emphasize familiar expressions of communal identity, they do
so with a credibility and legitimacy that is often not part of program-
matic community relations initiatives.
Leadership and Collective Identities
Less polarizing worldviews are best developed as closely as possible to
sources of communal legitimacy through internal transformation that
emphasizes the articulation of constructive alternative visions from
within each communal tradition. Liechty and Clegg (2001) have stressed
the importance of internal or local transformation in their excellent
work on religious sectarianism and reconciliation: ‘‘What is far more
constructive is for a community to learn to hear its own ancestral voices
anew, with or without the aid of outside voices . . . When destructive
ancestral voices are countered from within the tradition, they are weak-
ened and silenced as effectively as they ever can be’’ (178).
Research shows that leaders have the ability to shape collective iden-
tity and its cultural expressions (Brewer 2003). This is true only within
limits, however, because authority is a communal product. Pierre Bour-
dieu’s (1991) work on politics proves useful here because he recognizes
that authority is not something that political leaders possess; authority is
a resource within their constituencies which they access. Leaders com-
mand cultural capital that allows them to speak in such a way that their
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Conflict Transformation and Loyalist Identity 93
language is recognized as legitimate; they are able to tap into wells of
meaning that make up collective identity. With that ability, they repre-
sent the group to itself in innovative ways, but leaders who go too far in
jettisoning the cultural trappings of their community often find them-
selves with diminished influence in the community. As Lederach (1997)
argues, leaders ‘‘are under tremendous pressure to maintain a position
of strength vis à vis their adversaries and their own constituencies. . . .
This, coupled with a high degree of publicity, often constrains the free-
dom of maneuver of leaders operating at this level’’ (40). And yet, they
must seek some measure of freedom to maneuver in order to be effec-
tive negotiators. Politicians in Northern Ireland are no strangers to the
dilemma. Since the early 1980s, Sinn Féin’s political leadership has
worked tirelessly to hone the party’s ability to utilize the deep well of
republican myth, both claiming the cachet of the armed struggle and
cultivating politics as an equally powerful strategy in the hearts and
minds of the republican movement (Shirlow and McGovern 1998).
Gormley-Heenan and Robinson (2003) refer to this careful dance as
‘‘elastic band leadership.’’ Leaders in negotiations must deliver their
constituencies, so they must pay careful attention and present them-
selves as the receptacles of core beliefs and commitments. However, in
order to be effective negotiators, they must also stretch their constit-
uents to embrace new ideas and jettison some former commitments
(such as ‘‘not one inch’’ or ‘‘not one bullet,’’ in the Northern Ireland
case). The process of introducing new ideas and opening the commu-
nity to new possibilities can be a slow one. Collective identities must have
ontological continuity; they must have authenticity and be recognized
as bearing the imprimatur of the community. Moving too quickly can
endanger ontological security and create a backlash and a retreat to
insularity.
The potential also exists for local figures in communities to innovate
and contribute to the constructive reframing of their communal identi-
ties, and consequently, the way in which conflict is conducted. Referring
to peace processes in South Africa and Northern Ireland, Brewer (2003)
states, ‘‘In some cases local spaces are opening up in which, for example,
grassroots peacemaking and reconciliation are possible, and in which
new identities can be experimented with and perceived as possible or in
which existing identities come to be seen as more flexible and inclusive
than previously imagined’’ (163). In these cases, collective identities and
their cultural expressions can be subtly altered in ways that are ontologi-
cally consonant, but that open the group’s orientation to hear their
adversaries in a new constructive way or at least minimize the alienating
effect of a particular cultural expression. Liechty and Clegg (2001) refer
to this process as ‘‘mitigation’’ and define it as ‘‘. . . the capacity to lessen
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94 Lee A. Smithey
or eliminate possible negative outcomes of a belief, commitment, or
action. What cannot be negotiated can sometimes be mitigated’’ (229).
In short, practices that threaten and intimidate out-groups can be modi-
fied so that they are less likely to cause offense and feed destructive rela-
tions.
Action, Identity, and Feet-First Persuasion
Similarly, McCauley (2002) calls for ‘‘feet-first persuasion’’ noting a
‘‘power of small steps to motivate larger steps in the same direction.’’
One might consider it a slippery-slope model. The central mechanism
lies in the setting of precedents within communities. There is something
to be said for instances of innovation, moments in which groups rede-
fine themselves and even conduct conflict with opposing parties in less
destructive ways. Even experimentation can set precedents for further
development, at least in part because action and identity are recursively
related. The actions that groups or communities carry out both reflect
and contribute to the formation of their collective identities. Rituals and
expressions that feature less exclusive narratives and images can open
the way to a shared symbolic landscape and enhance the potential for
cooperation and coexistence.
Because intractable conflict is driven largely by polarized communal
identities and the mode of conflict methods employed, it is important
that transformation include changes in both of these factors. In many
cases, experimentation with a new collective action or a new twist on an
old tradition can trigger a reassessment of collective identity. McCauley
(2002) captures this in his discussion of dissonance theory: ‘‘When we
act in a way that is inconsistent with our attitudes and values, we are
likely to change our beliefs to rationalize the new behaviors. The motiva-
tion for the change is to avoid looking stupid or sleazy to ourselves or
others’’ (253). There are times during which a movement toward per-
suasive conflict methods, toward a more constructive stance, can pro-
voke a constructive redefinition of collective identity. Somewhere in this
cycle of action and identity, change takes place, both in the kinds of
actions in which communities engage when they encounter one another
and the construction of meaning and identity.
Influential meaning makers (intellectuals, artists, writers, poets, politi-
cal and civic leaders) articulate group identity through various media
that represent communities to themselves. In the process of disseminat-
ing rhetoric within the community and promoting persuasive or reward-
ing actions over others, they may incrementally influence communal
preferences concerning the conduct of conflict. Though this chapter
does not attempt to formally assess levels of local support for these initia-
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Conflict Transformation and Loyalist Identity 95
tives or degrees of implementation, they are among the factors that will
determine the extent to which initiatives can help undermine polariza-
tion between Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland.
Further research assessing the success or failure of these and similar
projects will reveal the ability (or inability) of alienated and traumatized
communities to contribute to postconflict peacebuilding in Northern
Ireland.6
Murals and Loyalist Cultural Innovation
Of particular relevance here is a new trend of cultural innovation devel-
oping within loyalist communities. Initiatives are emerging that aim to
reform cultural practices such as paramilitary murals, Orange Order
parades,7 and bonfires, to make them less offensive to nationalist and
republican communities, the British and Irish governments, and the
international community. On 12 July each year, the Orange Order cele-
brates the victory in 1690 of King William III’s victory over the Jacobite
forces of James II at the Battle of the Boyne. The Twelfth celebrations
are preceded on the Eleventh night by the burning of large bonfires in
Protestant communities across Northern Ireland. Tricolor flags of the
Republic of Ireland and other nationalist or republican symbols are
often burned with the bonfires.
The Orange Order in recent years has moved to make Twelfth
parades more family-friendly by sponsoring historical reenactments, fun
fairs, and Ulster-Scots musical performances. Indeed, in 2006, the Brit-
ish government pledged £104,000 to support the creation of an
‘‘Orangefest’’ to make the Twelfth celebrations more welcoming to tour-
ists (BBC 2006b). Belfast City Council has pledged £90,000 in a scheme
to downsize enormous Eleventh-night bonfires to symbolic beacons
(BBC 2006a). Plans have been proposed in some neighborhoods to
ensure that flags and banners do not linger on lampposts after the sum-
mer parading season has passed (see Bryan and Gillespie 2005). Leaders
in loyalist communities presumably hope through these initiatives to
maintain solidarity within their communities, diminish the sense of iso-
lation and exclusion they have experienced, and develop political
advantage by undermining the charges of triumphalism often leveled
against them. This focus is particularly timely, as the British and Irish
governments turn their attention to loyalist communities in an attempt
to win support for devolution and decommissioning of loyalist paramili-
tary organizations.
Murals in Northern Ireland have become one of the more famous
expressions of collective ethnopolitical identity. Historically, they have
been found primarily in loyalist neighborhoods. The practice can be
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96 Lee A. Smithey
traced to the turn of the twentieth century and became increasingly
common as partition was established in 1920. The Northern Ireland
state that followed ensured unionist ascendancy, and murals became a
widely accepted way for Protestant communities to declare their support
for unionist politics, and Protestant expressions of British loyalty were
approved if not officially sanctioned by the unionist-controlled Stor-
mont government. Early murals featured reproductions of King William
of Orange crossing the Boyne River atop his steed during the Battle of
the Boyne in 1690. Not surprisingly, murals have been connected to
annual Twelfth commemorations of the same battle in which the forces
of the Protestant ‘‘King Billy’’ defeated the deposed Catholic King James
II and his Jacobite army. During the Twelfth holidays, murals were often
unveiled and retouched to complement a range of other traditional
activities such as the erection of arches, bunting, and flags, the painting
of curbstones, and of course, parades by the loyal institutions, such as
the Orange Order (Bryan 2000; Jarman 1997; Rolston 1991).
As Rolston (1991, 1992) reports, the comfortable relationship
between Protestants and the British government became strained with
the advent of the Troubles in the late 1960s, and as the local Stormont
government was superseded by direct rule from Westminster. Loyalist
murals declined amid unionist and loyalist confusion over their new
status as British citizens who were increasingly dissatisfied with British
policy in Northern Ireland. The murals that did appear largely aban-
doned the traditional themes of Britishness and Protestant ascendancy
and turned to iconic references to Ulster,8 such as the flag of Northern
Ireland, which features the Red Hand and St. George’s cross. Through
the late 1980s and 1990s, loyalist murals proliferated and became mili-
tant, featuring loyalist paramilitary organizations such as the Ulster Vol-
unteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom
Fighters (UDA/UFF), and the Red Hand Commando. Younger politi-
cized painters commonly produced images of balaclava-clad paramili-
tary members wielding automatic weapons surrounded by flags, slogans,
and emblems. Intimidating murals such as these in both loyalist and
republican neighborhoods are common and have served to mark terri-
tory and project threat to outsiders while discouraging dissent within
communities. In loyalist communities, paramilitary murals have also
been used to distinguish territory controlled by rival paramilitary organi-
zations.
Like other forms of collective cultural expression, murals represent
communities to themselves and help define collective identity in a num-
ber of ways: through shaping collective memory, commemorating lost
comrades and community members, declaring that the community is
under pressure or attack, or memorializing a long history of sacrifice.
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Figure 5.1. UVF mural in West Belfast, a typical paramilitary representation.
Rolston (1992) describes the expressive character of murals: ‘‘Through
their murals both loyalists and republicans parade their ideologies pub-
licly. The murals act, therefore, as a sort of barometer of political ideol-
ogy. Not only do they articulate what republicanism or loyalism stands
for in general, but, manifestly or otherwise, they reveal the current status
of each of these political beliefs’’ (27). Murals exhibit political ideology,
and in the case of Northern Ireland’s loyalists, the decline and resur-
gence of mural painting as well as its content have reflected the broad
outlines of the unionist and loyalist psyche. This, incidentally, is not to
say that all residents of loyalist neighborhoods appreciate or condone
paramilitary activity or the murals that valorize them and mark territory.
In fact, murals are often placed without the consent of local residents
under an unspoken threat of intimidation that ensures paramilitary
organizations can claim territory as they see fit through the placement
of murals. Nonetheless, Neil Jarman argues that murals have not just
reflected but have promoted solidarity in both loyalist and republican
3441595.
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98 Lee A. Smithey
neighborhoods. From the beginning, ‘‘Murals helped to transform
‘areas where Protestants lived’ into ‘Protestant areas,’ ’’ and ‘‘All murals
create a new type of space, they redefine mundane public space as a
politicized place and can thereby help to reclaim it for the community’’
(Jarman 2005:176, 179).
However, as Jarman argues, collective expressions such as murals can
also be appropriated in innovative ways for new agendas and thus, I
would argue, have the potential to shape collective identity. In a similar
fashion, they could perform the mitigating work of redefining collective
identities in less polarizing ways. To examine this idea, I consider the
role that murals have played recently within local initiatives to redevelop
some of Belfast’s struggling working-class neighborhoods. In these
instances, local organizations, many with hardline loyalist credentials,
have undertaken to modify cultural expressions, in particular murals, in
order to improve their neighborhoods. These initiatives take up some
of the aspirations of the earlier community arts program but also aim to
enrich loyalist identity.
Local leaders, for example ex-combatants and Orangemen, grasp the
depth of trauma their communities have experienced, even if they have
contributed directly or indirectly to that trauma. They are themselves
deeply immersed in loyalist communal identities, but for a variety of rea-
sons, they perceive a need to reframe loyalism in new ways that are less
intimidating and offensive. Newsnight, a BBC news television program,
cleverly borrowed one of their video segment titles, ‘‘The Writing on the
Wall?’’ from a mural redesign initiative in East Belfast titled, ‘‘The Writ-
ing’s Not on the Wall’’ (2003b). The titles refer to a growing recognition
among Protestants that a return to majoritarian governance is impossi-
ble. Powersharing is inevitable, especially in a Europe where borders are
dissolving. Some loyalists understand that working-class Protestants
need to adapt to new political circumstances and develop the necessary
political skills to effectively engage nationalists and advocate for their
communities.
Murals have provided one avenue for experimenting with the refram-
ing of loyalist identity, and loyalist paramilitary organizations in some
areas have agreed to relinquish militant murals to be replaced by ‘‘cul-
tural murals’’ that present historical themes or other features of commu-
nal life that loyalists can claim as their own. In other cases, murals have
begun to take on a political tone that is not militaristic, but that still
expresses loyalist grievances and concerns in more articulate ways than
the iconic murals of the 1980s and the militaristic murals of the 1990s
could (though these are still quite common). In either case, one finds a
growing recognition, identified by Jarman, that murals, by virtue of their
media appeal can deliver messages beyond the confines of the neighbor-
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Figure 5.2. Titanic mural in downtown Belfast, a source of Protestant pride.
hoods in which the murals are painted (Jarman 2005). Indeed, several
of these projects have gained significant media attention.
Recently founded loyalist cultural organizations have redesigned par-
amilitary murals to display nonsectarian and nonexclusive local histori-
cal themes, such as the building of the Titanic. The most extensive of
the mural schemes in East Belfast was developed by a coalition of local
clergy, community development organizations, representatives from
local paramilitaries, and statutory bodies such as the Northern Ireland
Housing Executive, and Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), a
collaboration that is notable on its own in terms of the cooperation
between a range of state and nonstate organizations. In all, at least nine
murals were placed or redesigned featuring local historical themes that
included: the building of the Titanic in the East Belfast shipyards, the
famous footballer George Best, Protestant reformers, a local primary
school, Belfast native C. S. Lewis’s novel The Lion, the Witch, and the Ward-
robe, and Northern Ireland’s football team.
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The mural project constitutes one manifestation of an effort to recast
the loyalist narrative and of a broader shift among some loyalist paramil-
itary commanders (especially older ones) who want to avoid a return to
open conflict in Northern Ireland. They want to maintain their place
within communities as defenders, perhaps not against republican attack,
but against poverty and unemployment. As one commander said,
‘‘We’ve been part of the problem, we need to be part of the solution.’’
Mural redesigns have allowed loyalist leaders to test the waters of becom-
ing involved in community development, and may also have begun to
shift the balance of the content of loyalist identity. Instead of loyalism
being associated primarily with the violence of the Troubles, it begins to
take on new dimensions. ‘‘Cultural murals’’ highlight community his-
tory and achievements and thus sustain community identity while simul-
taneously tweaking the community’s symbolic landscape by replacing
overtly sectarian themes with others that define ‘‘us’’ without direct ref-
erence to ‘‘them.’’ Even murals that make political arguments about
grievances in the Protestant community, such as the conditions placed
on parades or the disbanding of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (which
Protestants have seen as a crucial bulwark against republican violence)
signal an engagement in political discourse that is more nuanced and
constructive than murals that emphasize the paramilitary defense of
loyalist neighborhoods, tit-for-tat retribution between loyalist and repub-
lican paramilitaries, and factional infighting among loyalist paramilita-
ries.
One is then led to ask several questions: Who is most credible in loyal-
ist communities and therefore capable of developing and advocating the
transformation of cultural expressions? How do they manage cultural
capital to best effect? Which of their initiatives prove successful and why?
At what point and under what circumstances do new cultural initiatives
fail? Do they fail because they are perceived as alien and become labeled
as disloyal or treacherous? Is there evidence that, when successful, they
open the door for improved community relations and political coopera-
tion? If so, can these initiatives be encouraged and sponsored by other
parties to the conflict or external actors? Answers to all of these ques-
tions cannot be offered here, warranting further culturally and psycho-
logically based research into the transformation of similarly intractable
conflict situations.
Conclusion
The mitigation of intimidating or polarizing cultural expressions is a
modest but important contribution to improved community relations.
Jim Wilson, a local loyalist community activist interviewed by the BBC in
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Figure 5.3. ‘‘Lest We Forget’’ mural in Belfast.
2003, acknowledged, ‘‘There’s only so far you can go in asking people
to remove murals, you cannot wipe away history and you cannot wipe
away what has happened in this country in the last thirty-five years just
by taking murals down’’ (BBC 2003b). Nevertheless, the process is criti-
cal to breaking down the deep psychological barriers that have perpetu-
ated intractable conflict in Northern Ireland. We need not be naı̈ve
either and trumpet mural redesign and new parading policies as the ulti-
mate indicators of change in loyalist paramilitaries or other loyalist orga-
nizations. Paramilitary murals are still commissioned, and paramilitary
leaders are careful not to appear as if they are selling out their organiza-
tions, and they will be wary of removing their murals without reciproca-
tion among rival paramilitary organizations (BBC 2005).
Political self-interest also drives participation in these and similar
schemes. Under a growing recognition that loyalism has a poor public
image, replacing sectarian murals can provide positive media spin and
new political advantages. A subtle and incremental softening of in-group
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102 Lee A. Smithey
and out-group boundaries is desirable, but in the long run, cosmetic
changes without cross-community engagement runs the risk of glossing
over the pain and trauma of decades of sectarian violence. Only shared
justice and reconciliation work will ensure a sustainable peace. For now,
mural redesign schemes, for example, do not often constitute cross-com-
munity work, though a recent mural redesign of a particularly offensive
mural in the staunchly loyalist neighborhood of Tullycarnet commemo-
rates the bravery of a Catholic from the Falls Road who was the only
person from Northern Ireland to receive the Victoria Cross for bravery
during World War II. According to Frankie Gallagher, a resident of Tul-
lycarnet and a member of the Ulster Political Research Group, which is
associated with the UDA,
We brought Catholics, from Dublin and Donegal and all over, into Tullycarnet
Estate, who had never been before. And they marched up the middle of the
road with an Orange flute band, with a military band, and everybody just walked
up the middle of the road around to the community centre where we all had a
knees-up after it, and it was fantastic. So there’s an educational side, there’s a
capacity-building side, there’s a confidence-building side, and there’s a dealing-
with-the-past side, and there’s this thing: Do you learn anything from it not to
make the same mistake in the future?9
The development of this sort of new inclusive narrative reveals a poten-
tial for community workers and former combatants in Northern Ireland
to develop symbols and narratives that challenge old psychological and
emotional barriers.
The British government obviously hopes to replicate the Tullycarnet
experience. In July 2006, the Northern Ireland Office Minister David
Hanson announced a £3.3 million funding package called ‘‘Re-Imaging
Communities Programs’’ (BBC 2005). Whether the intervention of a
state bureaucracy will undermine the authenticity of local efforts
remains to be seen. Across the political divide, nationalists are predict-
ably skeptical. SDLP politician Alban Maginness responded with incre-
dulity to the NIO funding scheme, ‘‘It is clear that any paramilitary
murals designed to intimidate or mark out territory should be
removed. . . . Indeed their very existence is illegal. That is why today’s
announcement really beggars belief ’’ (BBC 2005).
Modifying or mitigating offensive cultural expressions and hardened
in-group and out-group boundaries is a delicate undertaking. It is most
effective when leaders with credibility and legitimacy draw on familiar
resources such as the language and ethos of the community. Radical
departures are likely to be seen as betrayal within the group and depar-
tures from the long-established scripts of intergroup relationships are
likely to be met with skepticism across ethnopolitical divides. Nonethe-
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less, the softening of out-group boundaries is critical for long-term con-
flict transformation in Northern Ireland, and further research is needed
to identify the conditions under which initiatives such as the mural rede-
sign projects develop and how they can be encouraged, remembering
that the credibility of local voices is a critical component in the construc-
tive transformation of hardened ethnopolitical attitudes. Those voices
will often belong to individuals who are reviled in out-groups, and in
some quarters within groups. The process is bound to prove slow and
contentious but necessary.
Notes
1. ‘‘Loyalism’’ refers to an ideological or cultural commitment, held by many
Protestants who insist on Northern Ireland’s remaining part of the United King-
dom while also defending Protestant culture, faith, and identity. Loyalists are
often from working-class backgrounds, some of whom are involved in or would
support paramilitary organizations. ‘‘Unionism’’ refers to a political orientation
that emphasizes loyalty to the British crown and a commitment to Northern Ire-
land’s position within the United Kingdom. Parties such as the Ulster Unionist
Party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) represent unionist aspi-
rations through constitutional politics. There is often considerable overlap
between loyalism and unionism, as loyalists are unionists politically and often
vote for the DUP instead of the much smaller loyalist Progressive Unionist Party.
‘‘Nationalism’’ refers to political positions held primarily by Catholics that advo-
cate a united Ireland and emphasize civil equality for all, especially for Catholics,
who have historically not enjoyed full political and economic access. ‘‘Republi-
cans’’ constitute a subset of nationalists who insist on equality and a united Ire-
land and have been willing to employ both violent and political means.
2. It is worth noting that historical murals can also express sectarianism and
militancy depending on their content. Images of weapons and violence, even in
the context of Cromwell’s seventeenth-century campaign to pacify Ireland can
alienate and intimidate Irish Catholics.
3. Interview, July 2005.
4. Kriesberg (1998a) offers an immensely useful scheme for classifying con-
flict methods on a tridimensional continuum with poles representing coercion,
persuasion, and reward. Methods characterized primarily by coercion, as
opposed to persuasions and reward, are more likely to polarize opponents and
diminish the potential for constructive dialogical relationships.
5. Census data from 2001 show that 66 percent of the population live in areas
that are either more than 99 percent Protestant or 99 percent Catholic (up from
63 percent at the 1991 census) (Brown 2002). Recent research by Shuttleworth
and Lloyd (2006) using 2001 census data indicates that levels of segregation
have probably remained the same throughout the 1990s, findings that moderate
but do not extinguish concerns about levels of division between Catholics and
Protestants. For example, only 5 percent of students attend integrated schools
in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education 2004),
though in 2001, the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey reports that 73
percent of respondents felt the government should encourage more mixed
schooling (Queen’s University Belfast and University of Ulster 2001).
3441595.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
2.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f P
en
ns
yl
va
ni
a 
P
re
ss
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
104 Lee A. Smithey
6. I use the term ‘‘postconflict’’ here to refer to the study of peace and recon-
ciliation efforts after peace accords have been reached. The terminology, how-
ever, is actually a misnomer. In many if not most of these situations, the conflict
is more correctly understood to have entered a new phase of diminished vio-
lence.
7. The Orange Order is one of several all-male fraternal organizations that
dedicate themselves to the preservation of the Protestant faith and British sover-
eignty in Ireland. The Orange Order is the best-known, though others (some
closely affiliated with the Orange Order) include the Apprentice Boys of Derry,
the Independent Orange Order, the Royal Black Preceptory, and the Royal Arch
Purple.
8. The northernmost region of Ireland and the political borders of Northern
Ireland are often called Ulster.
9. Interview, January 2008. See also BBC (2003a).
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